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Introduction
As the technological abilities of modern medicine get more sophisti-

cated, the problems of defective fetuses and neonates will become

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ZIP___________-

lllore troublesome.! While the idea that a woman may legally and
lllorally abort her children found to be probably defective through
llnniocentesis enjoys widespread popularity among Americans, now
the question to be faced is whether the logic of this mentality has
begull to spread to . those children who, while defective, manage in
lOme way to be born. 2
There are other problems in. this delicate area as well. We have had
the case of the killing .of one of a set of twins found to be defective
•hUe the other was permitted to live; a selection of sex gender with its
evident dangers; the development of fetal operations which can
:_rrect many abnormalities thought previously to be unavoidable, etc.
&ue latter case poses acute problems for the abortion mentality since
~-- the fetus is treated as an independent patient and to that extent,
• COnsidered a human being. And what of the techonology of receding
the time of viability from six months to five-and-a-half months or even
l!arlier? What becomes of court decisions in the abortion cases and the
~ion of state interest? 4 This problem was considered by the minor~ Opinion in the most recent abortion decision of the U.S. Supreme
urt (Akron).
It should also be noted that the questions which follow are hard
~ions of law and ethics and no clear and ready answers or solutions will be available for the doctor, other medical personnel, ethics
110Jnrnittees, etc. What is imperative, however, is that we approach the
'lllestion with a profound respect for all human life, the parents as
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well as the defective children. If we are going to act like C 1., we
should act like God with compassion, justice, and equality . P1 ,aps a
serious dialogue can begin with the widespread use of eth1 committees which has now been recognized by the federal govern rr~ t .

set up for treating or not treating such children. The case of Infant
Doe from Bloomington, Indiana, was factually similar. 10
In this latter case, a severely retarded Down's syndrome child was
allowed to die by denying it the elemental human demands of food
. · and drink. It was originally the decision of her parents which the
The Cases
appellate courts of Indiana refused to stay or prevent. The child died
I
of dehydration and starvation before the. U.S. Supreme Court could
In the case of In re Mueller, a set of Siamese twins w: were
intervene. The legal question is not "moot" but is precedent in
allegedly denied food and oxygen at their parents' request cam to the
Indiana. But because there was no opinion in the case, it is difficult to
attention of the courts.5 The deformed twins were born May , 1981,
know exactly for what the case stands.
to a Danville Illinois physician and his wife. The twins were fo l' :i by a
The facts seem to show that Infant Doe was not dying at all. If the
judge on Ju~e 5, 1981, to be neglected children but, curiot~ y, the
child was dying and was beyond the scope of the healing process, as
same judge found no neglect on the part of the parents who • 1ew or
we shall explain, then there would have been no legal or moral probshould have known what was happening to their children in 1 ,e hoslem. As with all the dying, we would then withdraw the useless techpital. Someone was responsible for withholding ordinary f< 1d and
nology of medicine, make the patient as comfortable as possible, and
drink in a situation which was far from ethically clear. 6
let nature take its course. The cause of death would be the pathologThe state took temporary custody of the sons of Dr . .-tobert
ical condition of the patient for which we can do nothing further, not
Mueller and his wife, Pamela Schopp, when a social worker, al ing 0 ?
the removal of medicine or technology. The lawyer for the parents at
an anonymous call, visited Lakeview Medical Center an~ fm•nd ~Vl~
first claimed that the child had only a "50/50 chance of survival" with
dence of neglect. In fact, what she found was that the S1ame. " twm
a simple operation to open a fistula which was blocking the esophagus.
were denied food and drink to the point where their ribs W•: re proIn fact, under questioning, he admitted that this figure was incorrect
truding. 7 In effect, they were being allowed to starve.
and that Infant Doe "could have surgery with more than an even
The twins were joined at the waist and shared three leg<;. More
chance of success" according to expert medical testimony. In sum, it
ominously for their future, they shared a common digestive s~stem
aeems that Infant Doe was allowed to dehydrate and starve to death
and some vital organs.s While custody was being decided, the childr~n
because she was retarded. Under those circumstances, parents and
were examined and cared for at Children's Memorial Hospital. m
their doctors decided to "let nature take its course." This was, in
Chicago, to determine whether . they could ~e separated . Med~c~
reality, a twist in the evident meaning of the English language. If o~e
experts gave a negative prognosis for separatiOn. In fact, the fm
Withdraws food and drink from any child, it will die and the cause will
resolution of the case indicated that no one was responsible for ~be
be the refusal, not "nature." As little information as possible was
neglect since the parents were finally awarded custody of t he twms
liven by all concerned - lawyers, parents, hospital personnel and
who were permitted to be taken home.
authorities - which seems strange under the circumstances, given the
The ethical and legal issues here are momentous since there are n~
notoriety which the case received nationally. If~ as claimed, there were
recorded cases in which either parents or physicians have been h~l
two acceptable medical procedures open to the parents, one of which
civilly or criminally liable for failure to maintain children born with
was nontreatment why was this fact not made clear from the onset? The
..
either defects or conditions
such that the parents are unw ill'gto
m .d
Ieason, however, seems to be clear: for the first time in the history of
live with them. In a sense, what we have in these cases is the ot her SI :
the United States, an ·appellate court justified out-and-out euthanasia
of the coin of the Phillip Becker case where a young Down's syndromts
for the sole reason that the subject was retarded. Since Infant Doe
·
12-year-old boy was refused corrective
heart surgery by t h e paren
died of dehydration and starvation, the withholding of food and drink
and this was upheld by the California courts for no other reason than
was the direct cause of death.
that the boy was retarded.9 The difference is that in the Mu eller casd
· In October, 1973, an article appeared entitled "Moral and Ethical
the defect was detected immediately at birth and the attempte
Dilemmas in the Special Care Nursery."ll The authors reported that
remedy was a sort of post-natal abortion. This practice is not new • as
lOme 43 (14 percent) of the 249 consecutive infant deaths at the Yale
we shall soon' see_ Involuntary euthanasia <:>n defe~tiv~ neo~a~e: :~
University School of Medicine special care nursery were related to
been going on for well over a decade at varwus umvers1t y cllmc.
f
Withholding treatment. The parents and physicians in a joint decision
hospitals. It is only recently that it has been brought to the not ice ~e
decided that the infants' prognosis for meaningful life was very poor
public authorities. Some legal and moral standards, therefore, must
lllld therefore treatment was to be rejected. The standards used by the
'
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medical clinic were not explained by the article.
In an earlier case, Maine Medical Center v. Houle, 12 a male fant
was born without a left eye and a left ear, with a deformed lef 1and
and a tracheoesophageal fistula. Without surgical repair (a :inor
operation), the infant would die. The parents were informed an they
directed the physician not to operate on the child and to w l hold
feedings and intravenous fluids. The Center petitioned t he ·t ate
superior court for a temporary restraining order to maintain ntra·
venous feedings .pending the court's ruling on the question of r .·gical
intervention. The child developed seizures which were interpr " ed as
brain damage. The court granted the restraining order and order· d the
parents not to interfere with the efforts of the physicians to p• ·form
surgery; to do so would constitute child neglect. The pedia<rician
notified the court of the severity of the prognosis and the cond i; H.m of
the child. The judge ruled that "the issue is not the prospective 1.:; ~tality
of life to be preserved." Houle held that the evaluation (i.e., t he value
to be assigned to this life or any life) is beyond the scope of a 1Jhysician's medical expertise beca~se "quality of life" judgmei<-.s are
beyond the physician's medical expertise, and that with holding
consent to the operation would constitute "neglect" on the part of
the parents. In the words of the court: "The most basic right enj oyed
by every human being is the right to life itself." The court acted as
parens patriae, appointed a guardian to consent to surgery, and
enjoined the parents from interfering from any future medical t reatment. The infant died on Feb. 24, 197 4.
In this case, as well as in the Mueller, Infant Doe, and Becker cases,
the parents were particularly angered over interference in "a strictly
private and familial matter." The matters of family privacy and
parental decision-making are, of course, principles of good law and
ethics generally. But it seems that the above cited cases, while few,
should warn us that more is involved here than just these principles:
who speaks for the defective child who has an independent right to
life? With regard to these cases, the following remarks are in order.

First of all, in each of these cases,. we are not in a Roe situation
since all of these children have been born and, presumably, have met
the constitutional requirement for personhood with full rights, including a right to life. Leaving the fate of such persons to the interested
discretion of parents and doctors can be seen as an arbitrary denial of
due process and equal protection. What is at work, at least in these
few cases, is a quality-of-life argument decided by interested parents
and doctors, for which there is little legal precedent. We are not dealing here with a "prolongation of dying" of terminally ill patients, but
with children who will have a diminished human capacity.

Secondly, any legal response to this question of involuntary euthanasia depends on our expectations of what law can and should accomplish in this situation. 1 3 Any such determination in the final analysis
can only be made by the broader determination of law as public
policy made by a legislature or by the people themselves: Are these
defective children a definable class? Are certain instances of withholding treatment morally justified or soc.i ally desirable and who is to
make this decision fairly and impartially after a consideration of all
the facts? What criteria or standards should be established to define
such a Class? Legal rules must focus on criteria, procedures, and decision-making processes for implementing a social policy in this area of
involuntary passive euthanasia. These legal-ethical questions must be
answered before we can begin to think about a legal or social policy or
a juridical determination. Due process is a legal as well as a moral
obligation to every person, irrespective of whether he or she is capable
of invoking this right. This right exists in the face of government and
every other person, parents included.
These cases involve hard questions of social policy which must be
faced by the legislature. Failure to do so not only makes the work of
COurts necessary but also confusing, as the case law in this area has
clearly shown. Failure by the legislature to establish public policy in
this area also contributes to lack of objective standards to be followed
by parents, hospitals and medical personnel.
When dealing with defectivE1 neonates, it is truly difficult to give
ceneral rules and standards. Standards in general there must be, but
more important still are the values and intent of the <jecision-makers.
So many of these cases are so borderline, that is, in a gray area, that
leneral rules are inapplicable and some discretion must be left to
doctors, parents and other decision-makers for truly borderline cases
•here refusal of treatment is not due solely to the handicapped condition of the child. Herein lies the heart of this problem.
Thirdly, it should also be clear that the right to privacy simply
cannot be asserted by a whole group of parents of defective neonates
1rhen the rights of other citizens (their children) are possibly being
undermined and destroyed without due process. Thus, some general
Plesumptions and objective criteria must be set up to insure a fair and
impartial application, wh~re the subjects of rights (children) can give
no consent to their own treatment and a substituted consent of some
form must be found. We shall try to outline these standards in the
final section of this paper.
Substituted consent for these defective neonates is really a misnomer. There is no possibility of finding what they would want, were
able to see and understand their present condition. We are dealIng with persons who will lead, at best, diminished lives as in the
8aikewicz case,14 but for whom treatment will prolong th~ir lives.
'I'herefore, it is crucial to understand that any election not to treat
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defective neonates outside of the "poor medical prognosis" co ·xt, is
really based on a "quality of life" determination which is esst. ·ally a
question Of SOcial and, therefore, legislative policy. It is also a , 'J Stion
of value choice, of the meaning of death and life, a question ·yond
the competence per se of any medical or hospital personnel.
It may well be that, as a society, we will decide not to treat ,rtain,
well-defined classes of persons (severely retarded, senile; etc. ut the
welllegal and moral guidelines and standards should be reasonai
defined and the circumstances rather clear where treatment wr ·1ot be
well
refused except in the most hopeless medical cases.15 It may
be that our society is actually afraid to articulate such guideli s for a
variety of reasons and is therefore willing to consign these ca$ either
to the private discretion of some (e.g., parents and doctors ) ( to the
courts. The difficulty with this is that, in the former solutio n e are
left without clearly defined standards so that neonates are ~.:- ven no
fundamental due process which will fairly safeguard their rig. t t o life,
while the latter solution has led to judicial confusion concen .mg the
standards to be applied in similar cases.1s
Questions Might Be Asked
For example, in the cases of defective newborns, some cour t s might
seek to ask, as the Quinlan court did, what the newborn wou ld decide
(substitute consent) were he capable of doing so.17 Yet, w e might
want to ask why a defective infant might want to die. First of all, this
is already a false question because, besides the miracule dictu or fanciful nature of the answer' we are
grave danger of imposing o ur own
values upon the child who has absolutely no basis for the fears and
horrors we might have for ourselves in a similar state. We project our
values onto the child by this quality of life argument. The fundamental error here is that this proposition presupposes, first, a higher
level of health, consciousness, awareness, etc., and then a degeneration
from this state. By definition, this state is, and has always been, absent
from the defective newborn who might well be happy and sat isfied to
live out his limited human potential, having never realized what he is
missing. This can only be realized by those who have in fact recognized the higher levels of intelligence .and human co~sciou sn~ss and
who now project their potential lack or loss on those who never had it
in the first place. We are in grave danger of confusing our suffering
(physician, parents, judge, general public) with that of the child who
has never known any other existence and who, for all we know, would
be perfectly cotttent to live as he or she is. In fact, it is well-known
that many of these handicapped children are capable of giving and
receiving love and generally taking care of themselves. In protected or
sheltered environments, many of them even lead productive lives. But
all this becomes a basic question in classical public policy of how far,

m
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• a society, do we wish to revere, treat and protect such people. 18
'Ibis fanciful projection in the ·Quinlan and Saikewicz decisions made
those decisions less credible.
While Karen Quinlan, of course, was not retarded from birth as was
. 'Saikewicz, the relation between the two cases is that in both, the
patients were incapable of exercising their own right of privacy and
courts had to find a way of doing it for the.m. They used "substituted
consent" for this purpose.
In all of this discussion, perhaps it can be stated differently again:
the fact is that we have never known what it is to be of such diminished capacity as never to. have known any other life. That makes it
impossible for us to change places with both groups, i.e., those who
Dever had the capacity in the first place and those who, like Karen
Quinlan, had it and then lost it.
Fourth, it is noteworthy that there are correlations between
parental acceptance of their handicapped children and such factors as
religion, social class and the presence of supportive friends and relatives. As one expert put it: "But parents learn to value and love their
children as they live with them." 19 In any case, there is no clear or
COnvincing reason why a diminished future should bother the person
lrho has known no other level of life. What it does is disturb other
Jleople, such as parents and doctors. There are certainly no convincing
llRUments for this alternative of dealing with the problem so far
advanced by those who want to kill them "for their own good" or,
1Vbat amounts to the same thing, not to treat them as they would
other "normal" children or adults similarly situated and thus "allow
them to die."
More to the point, as a society we should be terribly skeptical about
l strong group (parents and doctors) who want to kill, or not treat, or
do away with a weaker group (defective newborns) "for their own
IOod," simply because they are handicapped. History is too replete
1rith such examples to take this argument very seriously either as a
lllatter of law or of public policy. In the words of P. Foot: " With
children who are born with Down's Syndrome it is, however, quite
different [than children soon to die] . Most of these are able to live on
for quite awhile in a reasonably contented way, remaining like children all of their lives but ~pable of affectionate relationships and able
to play games and perform simple tasks. The fact is, of course,that the
doctors who recommend against life-saving procedures for handicapped infants are usually thinking not of them, but rather of their
Plrents, and of other children in the family, or of the 'burden on
IOciety' if the children survive. So it is not for their sake but to avoid
trouble to others that they are allowed to die." 20
Fifth, the easiest cases to decide in this area are those children
1rbose "medical prognosis is wretchedly bad," and who would die in a
'-Y short time no matter what we would do. When this basic medical
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decision or prognosis is made in good faith and according t o
_pted
medical standards, all support systems, including I.V. (outsid £' · those
necessary for the comfort of the child), may be legally and orally
discontinued since such a procedure no longer has any human .aning
or significance (e.g., anencephalic newborns). One is not obligat to do
the fut ile or to continue the useless; neither are we obligatee o take
disproportionate measures to continue a life which would b me of
constant pain. " Primum non nocere. " This was the basic cone • ·ion of
the Qu inlan court as it set up the procedure to be followed · such
cases without further judicial intervention and it can be applie•· to the
situation of defective neonates as well. 2 1 It should be noted, r •wever,
that even in these cases of dying neonates, fundamental nutrit 1ts and
water are part of the comfort of the patient and should · 1 ot be
removed simply to hasten the moment of death. They 1.1ay be
removed, however, in situations where their administration is part of
the pain condition itself or where they plainly prolong dea tl1 while
doing no real good for the patient. Discretion here lies with t he medical personnel.
More Difficult Cases Exist
But there are the much more difficult cases of mentally and /or
physically defective persons who will live diminished lives, but from
whom accepted and comparatively simple procedur~s have been withheld so that they are " allowed to die, " when those procedures could
have prolonged their admittedly limited lives, as seems to be the situation in the Mueller and Infant Doe cases. This was the object ive of
Public Law 504 (Rehabilitation Act of 1973). What fair criter ia can be
set up in such cases to distinguish the three cases- the prolongat ion
of dying cases, the refusal of treatment based principally on m ental or
physical retardation, and the cases in the gray or ambiguous area?
The problem to be faced in these tragic situations is both m oral and
legal. The moral question is, " What category of patients do we - as a
society - simply not wish to treat?" The answer we are beginning to
receive, at least in the cases of defective neonates cited above, is t hat
since their " quality" of life ·is so bad (and since there are no defined
standards, this term is anything the decision-maker wants it to mean),
they should be allowed to die. We are beginning to see a subtle erosion
away from the presumption of life for these children to one against
them . Moral questions simply cannot be shirked by a society and t hese
categories of human beings (the senile aged, the severely mentally and
physically handicapped neonates) will simply not go away. Given our
sophisticated technology, their number will, in fact, increase.
In addition, there is an important legal question here which follows
hard on the moral question. What is happening in the courts in the feW
cases handed down concerning defective persons is : 1) such defective
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children are not being treated the same as other " normal" children in
the same situation (Becker, Mueller, Infant Doe and possibly Baby
lane Doe); and 2) the standard used in these cases by t hose who are
basically interested parties is subjective and dangerous (" quality of
life") for these groups themselves. It is disturbingly clear in these few
cases that it is the courts themselves which are therefore creating great
protection difficulties in the way t hey are treating these people .22.2a
What should be clear at once is that parents and their physicians
alone cannot be trusted to make such decisions for such defective
human beings. Both of these groups have a significant conflict of
interests which impairs their judgment negatively in a life and death
lituation, such as in the Mueller case, where decisions affecting the
children must be made comparatively soon after birth. The parents'
interest may well be to save their own psychological and economic life
II well as that, perhaps, of their own children, past and future. Such
children may be a burden to their parents, but in that case, this would
lllake the parents bad decision-makers, under the circumstances. Similarly, the physician is usually more affected by those whose feelings
are most visible and tangible - the parents - if he or she is to be a
very objective articulator of the child's interest. What physicians are
lluly capable of doing is to give an honest and complete evaluation of
the situation and, if certain agreed upon standards are met (cf. infra ),
then parents and doctors, as fundamental decision-makers, can proceed legally and morally.
In fact, most physicians in various studies tend not to want to treat
a!ch infants since they represent a failure for the physicians or at
least, most physicians consider such infants better off dead - even
though some parents do not share views of their physicians, yet t hey
Dever say so. 24 If these studies are correct, then we have a significant
Jll'oblem where some treating physicians believe in the loose thinking
of the "quality of life" theory without the guidance of some objective
ltandards. The dangers implicit in such a situation are obvious, particularly for purposes of due process for these neonates.
Who, then, can be trusted with such decisions? The Quinlan decilion at least provided some protection for incompetents in a prolonged dying situation by a diffusion of decision-making representing
a Bocietal consensus (ethics committee). And, by analogy, the same
ft!asoning may be applied to newborn defective children who are in
the same situation: while acknowledging the parents as appropriat e
llardians, and protecting their right to participate in the cessation of
llledically useless treatment, the court stated that such a decision would
be legally valid only if it had the approval of a hospital ethics committee. Whatever one thinks of the final function of such a committee, it
does introduce the recognition of the impermissibility of physician(s)
IDd family making such important decisions alone, with no protection
for the helpless child. In other words, this method of decision diffuAucust,1984
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sion is not to be construed as an unwillingness to assume P· :;anal
responsibility on the part of parents and physicians, but rat h ( as an
incipient effort to reach some form of societal consensus o . these
edges of life issues and to take them out of exclusive hands c t hose
(parents, physicians) who have a negat ive vested interest in tl case.
This would fit in well with Professor Robertson 's suggestion t l -t , for
the most ex treme cases, society, through the legislature o r ,JurtS,
should recognize certain objective criteria where treatmen t an be
refused: " But, just as authoritative and specific criteria have en :d the
physician 's determination of when brain death has occurred , t l ~ risks
of delegating treatment to parents, physicians, or committee s ·an be
similarly lessened if specific. criteria are developed t o describ<: defec·
tive characteristics in the familial or institutional situations in which
treatment may be withheld from defective infants." 25 If su e stan·
dards are established, an ethics committee might well prove u se ul. We
shall develop the notion of ethics committees a little further tn this
study. In any case, what Professor RobE;!rtson is arguing for .> both
objective criteria of what standards are to be used for when to treat
and not to treat, at least in general. This would also be in itself a form
of due process as well.
Perhaps this is as far as we can go. Perhaps, t o openly ackn wledge
that we are willing to treat the retarded, the senile or severely defec·
tive neonates differently from the " normal" patient is so off ensive to
society's view of the equality of citizens that its explicit kno w ledge is
impossible. We then need to rationalize a way to treat them differ·
ently, and the notion of substituted judgment seems to be o ne such
invention by the courts. And yet, if we can establish some m inimal
standards which will justify refusal or removal of treatment, perhaps
this would be as far as we can go with rules. In this sense , ethics
committees can be invaluable at arriving at such a societal m oral con·
sensus. While it should be noted that a " societal moral consensus" is
not necessarily objectively correct, what such a consensus does do in a
democracy is to take that decision out of the hands of a few int erested
parties. The process has, I believe, fewer abuses.
Necessity of Proper Information
Finally, it would also seem part of 'the legal obligation of informed
consent by the parents that they be objectively and fully informed of
the possibility of taking many of the defective newborns h ome and
having a wholesome - at least in some cases- familial experience.
Recent studies have shown this to be much more prevalent t han previously suspected, either by physicians or by the general p ublic. A_s
another expert has put it: " Those who have lived with t h e handi·
capped seem to reject any necessary incompatibility between being
handicapped and leading a worthwhile life, a conclusion that ought to
264
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be taken into account by those charged with making decisions about
the 'right to life' of infants with birth defects. " 26 The story of such
parents has yet to be written and told.
The real problem in this area is how to restrict legally a refusal to
treat the extreme cases, which many thoughtful physicians believe do
· · exist.
The AMA Judicial Council has tried to deal w ith the most extreme
of these cases: " A decision whether to treat a severely defective infant
and exert maximal efforts to sustain life" should be left to the
parentS. No one could quarrel with this, as long as the parents are fully
informed of all the possibilities, and the decision is restricted to a very
narrow category of cases . But this is not what is happening in this
field. Outside of " maximal care," we have rather simple medical procedures being refused in order to bring about death and, as in the
Mueller and Infant Doe cases, the withholding of ordinary food and
drink for the seemingly sole reason of physical and mental handicap.
It is these latter hard cases which cause all the legal and moral problems. We need some clear procedures in this painful area. In fact, the
AMA guidelines of 1975 simply abandon the field to the exclusive
decision of the parents which, as we have seen, cannot be conceded by
any society dedicated to due process.
III
. The following legal standards will help minimize the risks to others
(e.g., medical personnel, hospitals, the parents t hemselves), but still,
the real danger here is the outgrowth of measures already morally and
legany accepted in our society against defective human life which is
unborn. It seems only a small but logical step to correct what we
lllissed only a short tiine before. In fact, this has been suggested by
aome doctors and experts in the field. 27 As we have mentioned, this is
not a direct problem of law, but of society's attitude toward defective
human life, which then comes to affect the law. Once we start down
this road of justifying the taking of any human life, for whatever
reason, it is difficult to control its logical application to those who
have managed to be born defectively.
Even after the few cases relating to defective neonates are carefully
ex_amined, there emerge few clear and sure guidel~es for ethics comlllittees, physicians and parents to follow in knowmg when to treat or
not treat. The following guidelines are legal and moral, garnered from
lOme of the cases, as well as from good medical practice, which can be
Uled as initial starting points: 28
(1) As a general rule, parents are, in fact and in law, the principal
decision-makers for the health care of their children. This principle is
•ell established whether in natural or in constitutional law. Outside
of the excepti~ns given below, their desires and wishes are to be
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(3) While it is difficult to determine always what " accepted r P.dical
standards" are at any one t ime (what is ex traordinary today 1. ay be
ordinary procedure tomorrow), the presumption is that the p h : ;;ician
is acquainted with the ordinary standard of the profession . '.•deed,
this is his obligation under the law as minimal competence . f non·
treatment or treat ment i,s within that range, the doctor may ( nmply
with the parents' wishes. If the doctor is uncertain as to progn usis, he
should consult another independent doctor, who is to p e rf,;rm an
independent examination of the child. (By independent I m ean disinterested in the outcome, whether for research, transplant atwn, or
for any other reason.) It would also be of great value in an y ;;.rea of
doubt for the doctor to have an et hics committee which h e could
consult, for decision diffusion, dispassion, and some expert in put in
t his delicate matter. Such a committee could be composed o f a cross·
section of prominent legal, medical, ethical and religious talen t. "0
(4) If the parents decide not to treat, and to permit the child to die,
it is imperative that the doctor seek the independent evalu at ion of
another disinterested doctor before he acquiesces in the desire of the
parents (presuming, of course, that the course of action is su pported
by good and accepted medical standards). These standards will be
discussed more inodetail in section 6.
(5) If the doctor and the independent examining doctor conclude
that nontreatment by the doctor is not in conformity with accept~
medical procedure, then the attending doctor must point .out th15
situation to the parents and explain the reasons why this is so. If the
parents insist on nontreatment, nonetheless, the doctor o r hospital
administrator should not hesitate to petition a court of co m petent
jurisdiction for the appointment of a guardian to consent t o treatment.
(6) What are .the standards to be used not to treat? This is a difficult
question because these standards are always evolving. Indeed , it is the
very nature of medical progress that they do evolve, for the better.
But, lacking any absolute legal standards, the following may be safely
followed:

- Where death will come about imminently, no matter what we do ,
there is no legal or moral obligation to treat or to continue .t o treat,
outside of basic procedures, to make the child comfortable. 31
- Where there is no probable medical possibility - given our present
· knowledge of medicine- of the child ever achieving any cognit ive
or sapient stage of conscious realization, no treatment need be given
(or commenced) nor need treatment be. continued, except to make
the patient comfortable. The treatment is withheld here, not
because the child is retarded (the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution applies to them as well) but because the treatment is
medically and, therefore, humanly useless. Such a judgment is for
the doctor(s) to make as good medical practice. Morally and legally,
we are held to what is humanly possible now, not to what can or
will happen sometime and somewhere down the historical road.
- Where there is no probable medical possibility - given our present
knowledge of medicine - of the child ever achieving any cognitive
or sapient stage of conscious realization, no treatment need be given
(commenced) nor need treatment be continued . Once again, we are
held to what is humanly possible, not to what can or will happen
SOmetime and somewhere down the historical road .
- Many eminent authorities argue- and the author is in agreement
on this point- that where the child has no reasonable possibility of
ever being able to participate to any degree in human relationships
With others, no treatment need be commenced nor treatment con.tinued, beyond basic comfort of the child. One should carefully
know the limitation here: any degree of human relationship. This is
an admittedly difficult concept to deal with because it has been so
manipulated by the "quality of life " arguments for nontreatment of
otherwise defective neonates. To erase all ambiguity, we must insist
on this almost absolute "any" and this should be read in conjunction with the paragraph immediately preceding the present one.
There will be close cases and, as we shall p'o int out later, all preSUmptions should and must be resolved in favor of life and in favor
of the young patient. With this said, there remain true cases of
defective children where the brain is so under- or nondeveloped,
that we can say, with a great deal of medical certitude, that this
child has little or no hope of any human interaction. Once again,
the judgment is a medical one and all presumptions should and
Jnust be resolved in favor of the patient-child .
..,. Where there is no medical possibility or probability of alleviating
What reasonable medical judgment would consider to be an intolerable level of continued suffering, the same judgment should obtain
118 in the above cases. Human intervention must be for the good of
the patient (primum non nocere ), and if there is little probability
that good will come about, then it is both futile and cruel to act
further on this human being.
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followed by all others as the general rule. 29
(2) The physician(s) has (have) a legal and moral responsi b
be open and truthful to the parents of defective neonates, ;
after birth as possible. This calls for full disclosure and infor m
sent on the part of parents at the earliest possible time aJ
preliminary diagnosis has been established. All future medical
should be outlined for the parents or guardian , including n \
ment, risks, benefits, chance of success and the consequences
medical procedure available. The objective of this is to give p an
fullest information and possible options available to them so t l
can fully and knowingly consent to treatment or nontreatmen t
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However, in this last condition, precisely because there i~· :imension of the subj~ctive involved, another doctor, an ind, ndent
doctor, should examine the case along with, if possible, t h(· >Spital
ethics committee, if one exists. This condition should alsl ·e seen
in the light of good and accepted medical standards.
(7) To alleviate the intolerable decision-making in such ~ 1arged
and painfilled atmosphere, parents should be told that the qu. ion of
long-term custody of the child can be settled later. This w oL· ' allow
them to consent to care at a crucial juncture, rather than fo .J them
to participate in the child's death by nontreatment as the pr ·t of not
assuming long-term custody. By emphasizing that the approp · t~e~ess
of custody must be assessed continuously throughout the ch t 1 s l~e,
the parents could more comfortably commit themselves to t ;,, child,
one day at a time, without feeling boxed into the situation.
(8) If the doctor concludes that treatment will be ineffe t :.·e, but
the parents insist that it be undertaken, the doctor should acq l.· ;esce to
these desires, as long as the treatment does no further harm n o~· caus~s
any further suffering to the child. It it does, the doctor sh r.~ u ld, _m
conscience, refuse to perform, and speak to the parents about o btam.
ing a different physician.
(9) Under no circumstances should an active agent, or o th e~wlSe
legal procedure, whose direct object is to either kill or help ter~ mate
the life of the child, be administered. Much here depends on t he zntent
of the doctor and medical personnel. No court of law can really control or regulate this. For instance, it is certainly legally and m ~rallY
permissible to administer a large quantity of a pain-killing drug, if t~e
direct intent of the doctor is, in fact, to alleviate pain, even th ough It
has, as an indirect effect, the shortening of the life of the patient.
.
(10) In all cases, basic comfort and care should be given. ThiS
should include food and water in all but cases where it is actuallY
painful for the child to receive even those. This should include
warmth, loving, touching, sanitation.
.
(11) Above all, the major rule in the area is that treatment 1s to be
withheld only in the clearest and most compelling cases of ho i?elessness, using the above-mentioned safeguarding criteria. If there ~s ~ny
doubt of this, it should be resolved in favor of the child, for .h lS lif~,
and for his best interests. In other words, the presumption is always m
favor of life and treatment and all doubts should be resolved in the
child's favor.
Conclusion
The case of Baby Jane Doe of New York is important because it
shows so clearly the pitfalls in this whole are~ of defective neonates{
The child was born severely retarded and w1th an operable case 0
spina bifida. The prognosis was uncertain, but doctors seemed to agree
268

Linacre QuarterlY

1

that with an operation, she might live to age 20; without it, to age two
or less. The difficulty here is that the parents invoked privacy and
have been able to block the federal government's request that it view
the records to determine whether the operation is being denied
· because she is retarded or for other reasons extrinsic to her retardaUon. This would seem to be a quite normal case of civil rights investiption (since Baby Jane has ho independent voice) on the part of
aovernment under the law (Section 504, Rehabilitation Act of 1973)
were it not for the strange attitude of the parents, medical personnel
and the courts, which prevents the government from determining facts
of the case which it has a legal obligation to do.
The limited purpose of rule 45 CFR Part 84 to be posted at the
nurses' station, restricts itself to cases in which nutrition and customary medical care are discriminatorily withheld from certain infants
10/ely because they are handicapped. This rule was made to enforce
the clear intent of law 504 under which it is unlawful for a recipient
of federal financial assistance to withhold from a handicapped infant
nutritional sustenance or medical or surgical treatment required to
correct a life-threatening condition solely because he/she is handie&pped and the handicap does not render treatment medically contraiodicated. In other words, both the law and the rule are consubstantial
to the same end of safeguarding the civil rights of a helpless group of
hutnans-in-being. For the reasons given supra, while the parents and
cloctors are normally the ones to make medical decisions for their children in life-threatening situations where the child is defective in some
lerious way, the history of the past 20 years has shown clearly that
lllch a child needs added protection to safeguard its basic civil rights.
The argument of the medical community against the new rule is
that it intrudes unnecessarily irito the privacy of parents and doctors
in proper medical decisions. Yet, given the history of abuse which we
bave outlined supra, the rule is a long overdue response to abuses by
IOJne doctors who have exceeded their own professional authority by
lllowing the withdrawal of medical treatment for nonmedical or
ideological reasons (a life of a "quality" not worth living). These
instances have been too well documented and too widely practiced to
take this complaint by doctors and parents seriously. The law and the
lllle are urgently needed.
·
Furthermore and in the same vein, the AMA's guidelines for defective infants and their treatment (1981) effectively deny the physieiin's traditional role as advocate on behalf of his patient in such
Cllles. They make him a mere consultant, allowing parents unlimited
lllthority ro refuse life-saving treatment for their handicapped children. These guidE>lines do not even intimate the legal and moral obligation of the physician to take legal action when the parents' decision
1rouid lead to neglect. Public Law 504 simply steps into a vacuum
tleated by the medical profession itself which has shown itself to be
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widely and seriously negligent in protecting these patients. This r ~hor
has great difficulty in understanding the reasoning of the com . for
striking this simple rule, posted in the nurses' station of fee cally
funded hospitals. In fact, in this area of law, courts have bem nly
compounding or condoning the crucial problem.
The case of Baby Jane Doe contradicts many of the standa1 s we
have established supra. Yet, if such standards were, in fact, fo] JWed
by the medical profession, they would obviate the necessity of j uing
rule 54 of Public Law 504. As the situation exists presently, wi 1 the
decision of the courts not to enforce the rule, children such as '3aby
Jane Doe have no independent advocates and are left to the art -:;rary
vagaries of parents and a medical profession which have a. eady
proven themselves quite neglectful in this delicate area. LegaL ', we
have not seen a group of humans so powerless since Dredd Scot t.
Further Developments
More recently, the government has further modified its pre . osed
rules. 32 In these last suggested rules, the government has attemp •ed to
modify criticism of rule 54 by mandating or encouraging the cr~ation
of hospital ethics committees. Such committees were originally
encouraged by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Quinlan
decision 33 with which the guardian of Karen Quinlan had to consult
before the removal of her life-sustaining equipment. Moreover, the
American Academy of Pediatrics, in its response to the federal rule
54, recommended the establishment of a version of hospital ethics
committees in place of hotlines and investigators:
The Academy believes the creation of infant bioethical review comm ittees
constitutes a direct, effective, and appropriate means of addressing the ex ist·
ing education and information gaps. 34

In fact, the most recent study on these legal-ethical problems recommends the establishment of such ethics committees.35 The most
recent literature in the field, 36 as well as national conferences on the
subject, 37 have taken up the theme as well.
Can such ethics committees substitute adequately for rule 54 in
living up to Public Law 504?
.
The arguments against the hotline and government agents d escend·
ing on health facilities have been well aired.
Intervention by the government is always retrospective and does
not by itself set up any standards for treatment or nontreatment . Such
an information procedure is erratic at best and can easily be used to
harrass and punish unpopular personnel. Such intervention causes
consternation and has a chilling effect on physicians and the hospital
and could easily poison the atmosphere of the unit as everyone begins
to suspect everyone else.
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Thus, in principle, we are reduced to three choices.
- First, we could permit the status quo, letting the physician and
the parents make these critical decisions. Yet, as we have seen, there
have been too many cases where defective neonates have been
· 4eprived of simple medical procedures (Infant Doe) simply because
the child was retarded. If there are two universally accepted standards
in this area, they are that 1) the principle that such decisions must be
made in the best interest of the child and 2) that Down's Syndrome is
not a justification for not treating an otherwise correctable, lifethreatening condition in a newborn. As we have also seen supra, in
general, family autonomy and parental burden (it is parents who must
bring up the child) must enjoy a presumption of decision-making. But
the presumption should give way, particularly in situations like defective neonates, where the emotionality of the rapid decision can cloud
judgment. In these edges-of-life decisions, parents and doctors need
help.
- Second, we could take these cases to court. Besides the inundation of cases which they would have to hear, courts are not particularly better decision-makers in this area than anyone else . Of course,
this does not rule out the role of courts- particularly in ambiguous
areas where there is a clear disagreement between the doctor who
COnsiders a particular procedure standard medical care under all the
circumstances, and the parents. Intervention by the court in such a
lituation is actually mandated.
- Third, we could. espouse direct governmental intervention with
IOJne of the drawbacks which we have cited supra. Can an ethics
C0Jnmittee act as a tertium quid to respect parental autonomy while
~tecting the civil rights of these children which the government is,
by law, obligated to do?
.
The answer is uncertain because ethics committees have hot been
C!lnployed to any large extent. 38 Such committees would be staffed
l by a cross section of the community to represent as much as possible
· the moral sense of the community itself. The ethics committee should
be composed of personnel mostly independent of the institution so as
to avoid any confliCt or" interest or conflict of loyalty (even, perhaps,
Olle's employment). The purpose of the committee would not be to
Iaake decisions on its own, but to be there on a consultative basis for
the crucial ethical decisions to be used by all concerned.
ln other words, the committee's function would be to help others
llaake these crucial decisions or, in a real exception, to recommend to
the health care facility, court action itself. The help of the committee
COuld be used prospectively, that is, could be assembled and consulted
by anyone having an interest in the case: medical or hospital perIOnnel, parents or guardian, the administration of the hospital or any
llae!nber of the committee itself. Its records and testimony would be
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confidential and could be turned over to third parties only b. court
order.
The function of the committee would also be in retrot :ctiue
review of morally problematic decisions (there was some dout · tbout
whether nontreatment was morally justifiable). This kind of ~view
provides a forum to discuss how decisions could have bee made
better and how future cases could be better handled. In this se. e, the
committee's function logically leads to establishing institution ' poli·
cies for treatment/nontreatment decisions; it can also supp• t the
growth of good ethical decision-making in the hospital itself f l •'uture
cases.
Thus, the ethics committee; upon presentation of all the fa 1,s, can
make an ethical decision on those edges of life which could ..d and
strengthen the various parties who must make the essential d "~ision.
The decision is not made by the committee, since its functk n is to
help others make that vital decision.
Of course, if treatment is clearly called for (e.g., a simple prc~'edure
to open a fistula in an otherwise healthy Down's syndrome child who is
being allowed to starve because he/she is retarded), the co m mittee
should not hesitate to recommend court proceedings if the parents
refuse treatment.
And if the child will die, no matter what aggressive treat m ent is
given, the parents' wishes not to treat further except to make t he child
comfortable, should be respected by all concerned.
Problem Becomes Crucial
The problem for all (ethics committee, medical personnel, parents,
hospital administrators) becomes crucial when the situation is ambiguous or in the "gray areas," already described in the body of this
article. We have mentioned some principles already accepted univer·
sally as good medical procedure: best interest of the child, p arental
autonomy and family privacy and its presumption, and the right to
treatment for the physically and mentally handicapped in an other·
wise treatable situation. It . is this gray area which causes difficulties
and the ethics committee should provide all the help and enlighten·
ment it can in these difficult areas when the situation does not other·
wise clearly indicate treatment. If the committee believes that treat·
ment is otherwise morally obligatory because it is consistent with
ordinary or accepted medical procedure, and the parents refuse treat·
ment, the committee should not hesitate to advise the hospital to take
the case to court, where the ul~imate decision can be made in an
adversarial process.
While the function of such committees could be expanded to other
areas of ethical decision-making (comatose and dying patients, nursing
home care, cost analysis in the final stages of death, allocation of
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scarce health resources), it should be noted that with such committees
on hand and consulted, this would significantly reduce the dangers of
malpractice. The reason is that such committees represent not only a
. cross section of the community ("moral sense of the community"),
they also tend to increase the level and standard of care which must be
dearly shown to be absent in negligence actions. This is said only in
passing, but it could be a practical incentive for "practical headed"
administrators to at least give such committees a chance.
Under appropriate circumstances, a bioethical hospital committee
can therefore render value assistance to a health facility. The very least
that can be said about them is their implacement would be better than
what is presently available.
The arguments for hospital ethics committees cited supra are only a
beginning; as a society, we grapple together with these terrible pro blems of life and death which modern technological medicine has
bestowed on us. The question, like war, is too important for all of
us to be left exclusively to the interested parties of parents (guardians)
and doctors. Some independent person in these tragic situations must
speak for the child who cannot speak. Hospital ethics committees can
be the beginning of a badly needed dialogue between a worried public
and the medical community. This in turn will come, in its own way, to
influence "accepted medical standards," at least in the long run. After
all, medicine is as much an art as it is a science and therefore moral
and ethical values are crucial in medical decision-making. A wider
moral and ethical input can only help the medical community
morally, psychologically, and legally.
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BOOK REVIEWS
Moral Clarity in the Nuclear Age
Michael Novak
Thomas Nelson, Nashville, Tenn., 1983, 144 pp., $3.95.
The present booklet is a collection of articles on nuclear warfare by Mi_cha~l
Novak most of which were previously published in various journals. The title IS
borro~ed from the most important article in the booklet, which takes the form of
a letter from Catholic clergy and laity on nuclear warfare . Although written by
Novak, it was signed by more than a hundred Catholic clergy and laymen. !he
letter was motivated by concern about the earlier drafts of the recent Amencan
bishops' statement on war and peace. Although the final dra~t of the bish?p~'
atatement took a position not too distant from that found m the letter, It 1s
helpful to see the approach of the letter to the problem . _
_
While the letter recognizes the unique problem ra1sed by the discovery of
nuclear weapons , it also calls attention to the fact that this is not the first time
Christians have confronted the apocalyptic question. It is also reluctant to look at
the whole issue in terms of the worst possible scenario. So it is more hesitant,
then about the condemnation of any use of nuclear weapons than the bishops'
state'ment seemed to be. The bishops expressed themselves highly skeptical about
any use of nuclear weapons .
. Equal concern was shown in the Novak letter for the threat t~at comes from
the Marxist camp and the danger of blackmail arising from any d1splay of weakness.
On the issue of deterrence, the letter takes a stronger position than the bishops.
Again the fears of the bishops are more on the side of the arms race, and ~he
dange~s inherent in it. The letter focuses more on the risks involved in weake~mg
one's deterrence capabilities. Although aware of these risks, I would have to_d1ffer
with the Jetter on the question of intention in reference to deterrence. Wh1le not
allowing actual use, the letter considers the intention to use such _w~apons ~
necessary element of deterrence. This goes contrary to the whole Chnshan tradition in which sin begins in the intention.
_
There must obviously be some intention behind the possessiOn of nuclear
weapons. Otherwise, they would not even exist. The intention may and _m':lst go as
far as use for deterrence. ·In fact, it may even go so far as actual use w~thm moral
limits. But even if one were to hold that no actual use could be m~ral , and
therefore would allow no intention of actual use, I do not see ho~ th1s ;would
inhibit or weaken deterrence. In other words, I do not see why the mtentlon of
actual use should be considered necessary for the effectiveness of a deterrent.
Since intention is strictly internal, it is hard to see how it can have any external
impact in itself. The threat comes from actual possession of the weapons. As lo~g
II a country possesses such weapons, the enemy countr~ will _feel a thr~at. Th1s
Will remain true even if a country insists it has no mtentwn of usmg such
weapons. But it must be admitted that Novak becomes a little ambiguous about
the kind of intention about which he is speaking.
.
In the second article, Novak views the confrontation between the Umte~ St~tes
llld the Soviet Union as it appears to Europeans. After World War II until fairly
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